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Abstract: Recently, consumers have seen multiple products being advertised as smart home. These products promise to
make our homes more comfortable, safe, automated, and remotely controlled. To this new reality of process-
ing information it was given the name IoT (Internet of Things). Many news headlines have been published
exposing serious security vulnerabilities in many IoT devices, with some of them being exploited to make
one of the largest DDoS attacks recorded. In this paper we present a method developed with the purpose of
identifying high risk vulnerabilities in smart home IoT devices, giving application examples of actual vulner-
abilities found in two commercially available devices. This method uses several open source tools to identify
vulnerabilities in some of these IoT devices. Besides, we will also present some topics related to the main
threats and vulnerabilities that affect smart home IoT devices.
1 INTRODUCTION
IoT devices are gradually peaking the interest of con-
sumers. Several studies predict an almost exponen-
tial growth on the number of IoT devices, totalling
between 20 and 30 billion by 2020 (calsoft, 2018),
with the smart home IoT market also growing in rev-
enue. According to consumers (Perez, 2018), security
problems are the main factor that is slowing down IoT
growth.
In the past years, IoT devices have been seen
many times as insecure devices. In 2015 Syman-
tec (Barcena and Wueest, 2015) released a report
on which major vulnerabilities on many smart home
IoT devices were identified. In 2016 the Mirai boot-
net was responsible for one of the biggest DDoS
attacks ever recorded, using more than 600 thou-
sand devices, most of them IP cameras (Anton-
akakis et al., 2017). Two online databases https://
www.exploitee.rs/ and http://www.hardwaresecurity.
org/iot/database/) describe vulnerabilities on more
than 200 devices, where about half of them are smart
home IoT. On DEF CON 2017, one of the largest se-
curity and hacking conferences, 47 new vulnerabil-
ities were revealed on 23 devices from 21 different
manufacturers.
This number of vulnerabilities may lead con-
sumers to think that all IoT devices have serious se-
curity vulnerabilities, which, however, is not entirely
true. Even if a device has vulnerabilities, that does not
mean it is insecure. If a vulnerability can only be ex-
plored with physical access to the device, it represents
a small risk for the average consumer. With these fac-
tors in mind, it is crucial to identify vulnerabilities
that can be explored remotely, especially through the
internet.
This paper presents a method to identify vulner-
abilities in smart home IoT devices. This method
represents a practical approach that uses open source
tools to identify vulnerabilities that can be explored
through TCP/IP networks. The method can even be
applied to devices that aren’t smart home, allowing
manufacturers to identify the most explored vulnera-
bilities in cyberattacks, with a low cost method.
Additionally, the paper also presents a vision of
what IoT and smart home IoT are, by analysing as-
pects of its ecosystem, main vulnerabilities and their
real risk. Through these topics we will identify the
higher risk threats to data protection and to private
home security.
2 RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there is no method that
allows the identification and exploitation of vulnera-
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bilities in smart home IoT devices like the one here
presented. There are a few similar ones, but they are
based on automated scanning tools, that have trouble
if they cannot correctly identify the device (Visoot-
tiviseth et al., 2017)(Leite Da Silva, 2017). There are
others that focus on hardware and non TCP/IP net-
works (like Bluetooth and Zigbee) (Gupta, 2017), and
LLN networks that rely on IPv6 not currently adopted
by smart home IoT systems (Martins, 2018).
3 SMART HOME IOT DEVICES
Smart home is one of the many components that com-
poses IoT. According to one definition, a smart home
”is a house or living environment that contains the
technology to allow home devices and systems to be
controlled automatically” (Bing et al., 2011). Smart
home is a concept that has been around for quite some
time, but IoT made it more attractive.
There is still no consensual definition for the smart
home in the IoT era (Schiefer, 2015). For this reason
it is important to present the definition adopted in this
paper: smart home is ”a residence equipped with a
communications network, linking sensors and domes-
tic devices and appliances that can be remotely mon-
itored, accessed or controlled, and which provides
services that respond to the needs of its inhabitants”
(Ghaffarianhoseini et al., 2016).
3.1 From Architecture to Reality - The
Security Perspective
At some point we need to step out from the conceptual
models of architectures and look at the implementa-
tions adopted by the manufacturers. Because there
are no standard practices applied (Al-Qaseemi et al.,
2017), sometimes manufacturers’implementations do
not follow the architectures. This scenario may
change by global agreement of stakeholders in IoT
development, with efforts like the Code of Practice
for Consumer IoT Security (Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), 2018). Since we
are presenting a practical method, we need to define
how the current smart home IoT devices implement
the theoretical architectures. To this implementation
we will call smart home IoT ecosystem.
This ecosystem was built by studying the design
implemented by several manufacturers and also ac-
cording to the work of experts that conduct penetra-
tion tests on IoT devices (Pesce, 2017)(Gupta, 2017).
This ecosystem is divided into five components (see
Fig. 1):
• Hardware - Includes all the physical components
of the ecosystem including the firmware;
• Web Application - It can be used to configure,
control or access a device. In many cases, it is
hosted in a web server that resides in the device
itself;
• Mobile Application - These applications are
gradually replacing web applications since they
present more features and are more practical for
the user;
• Network and Cloud - It includes all communica-
tion between devices, the web and mobile appli-
cation, and the cloud;
• API - The Application Programming Interface
plays a crucial role in IoT. It makes the integra-
tion and interoperability between devices, appli-
cations, and the cloud possible.
Figure 1: Interaction between components of the smart
home IoT ecosystem.
4 SMART HOME IOT SECURITY
In this section we discuss security challenges, threats,
and current vulnerabilities of smart home IoT devices.
4.1 Security Challenges
IoT systems, especially smart home, have many
things in common with traditional computer net-
works, including some security problems. Within a
home network we may have devices like computers,
smartphones, and tablets that have lots of process-
ing power and are constantly monitored by users. On
the other hand, IoT devices have hardware and design
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limitations that prevent traditional security measures
from being easily implement. The following are some
of these limitations(Haritha and Lavanya, 2017):
• IoT devices often use low speed CPUs and are bat-
tery powered. Contemporary cryptography algo-
rithms require fast computation;
• IoT devices usually have memory restriction and
use low bandwidth communications. Current se-
curity schemes were not designed to support these
restrictions;
• In some cases, the installation of security patches
may be impossible. IoT devices use lightweight
operating system that might lack modules to re-
ceive and integrate new codes or libraries;
• The IoT universe is made of different types of de-
vices ranging from computers to RFID cards us-
ing different wireless protocols. It is hard to find
a security solution that is capable of accommodat-
ing all these devices.
4.2 Top Vulnerabilities
One of the differences between traditional computer
networks and IoT ones are the threats they face. Many
times, smart home IoT attacks have consequences
that transcend the boundaries of cyberspace and affect
people lives and the safety of their homes (Denning
et al., 2013)(Soltan et al., 2018). But many of these
attacks explore vulnerabilities that are well known by
IT Administrators and security experts. These vulner-
abilities gained an all new ”life” within IoT.
Within this big media coverage that preach an IoT
apocalypse (Newman, 2018)(Hiner, 2018) it is impor-
tant to identify the vulnerabilities that pose the biggest
risk to the safety of smart home IoT and their real im-
pact. Some may affect a big number of devices but
are not very easily exploited (Dorsey, 2018), there-
fore have a low risk. One of the biggest treats to smart
home networks are automated attacks. They have not
a specific home as a target, but a type of device or a
specific network service. With these aspects in mind,
the vulnerabilities that are more likely to be exploited
on smart home IoT attacks are the following(OWASP,
b)(Khan and Salah, 2018)(Embedi, 2018):
• Lack of security updates;
• Insecure web application and services authentica-
tion;
• Insecure services exposed to the internet;
• Insecure network communications.
4.3 Penetration Testing
IoT devices are bringing new security challenges to
home network security (see section 4.1). A vulnera-
bility in a smart door lock can lead to a robbery or
to other violent crimes (Denning et al., 2013). So
the need to test home network security can increase
with the growing adoption of smart home IoT devices.
Penetration testing is a well know technique applied
by ethical hackers, that makes use of some of the tools
employed by malicious hackers, in order to simulate
attacks and identify security vulnerabilities.
The method to identify vulnerabilities in smart
home IoT devices that we propose is based on the
PTES Standard (http://www.pentest-standard.org/).
This standard needed to be adapted since it lacks
some specific steps related to IoT smart home sys-
tems. For example, some of the information gather-
ing techniques suggested by the standard are targeted
to collect information about persons, like a company
CIO. In a smart home IoT ecosystem (see section 3.1)
the human factor is not that important so we need to
gather information from other sources like the devices
firmware or mobile application source code, to under-
stand how devices interact.
5 IDENTIFYING
VULNERABILITIES
This section presents the proposed method. The re-
spective results are presented in Section 6.
5.1 Introduction
The previous sections provided useful information in
order to understand the ideas behind this method.
Since we are still in the beginning of the IoT era
and manufacturers are still waiting for standardisation
of architectures and technologies (Briodagh, 2018),
there is no universal recipe to identify vulnerabilities
in IoT systems. By having a general understanding
of the ideas, challenges, current architectures, threats,
and vulnerabilities, this method becomes more eas-
ily adapted to different and future smart home IoT
ecosystems.
5.2 Method Structure
The method is divided into different stages and proce-
dures represented by an activity diagram (Omg, 2017)
(see Fig. 2).
Vulnerabilities in IoT Devices for Smart Home Environment
617
Figure 2: Activity diagram of the proposed method.
All the procedures and stages at the same level
can be executed in parallel, but only after all are com-
pleted we can move to the next level. The ones that
cannot be executed for some reason (e.g. the device
does not have a web interface) should be ignored to-
gether with the respective arcs; this would imply ad-
ditional paths in the diagram, yet, for better readabil-
ity, they are not presented. To make interpreting the
method easier, the numbering in the diagram matches
the ones of the following subsections.
ICISSP 2019 - 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy
618
5.3 Install and Configure an Operating
System (OS)
Correctly configuring a test environment is a key as-
pect in order to ensure that the tools we use work
properly. The easiest way is to use a pre-build operat-
ing system (OS) dedicated to ethical hacking. These
include some of the tools that will be used later in
the method. There are many OS’s available, but it is
import to choose one that is frequently updated. The
ones we tested and therefore recommend are the fol-
lowing:
• Kali Linux (https://www.kali.org)
• Parrot OS (https://www.parrotsec.org).
We also recommend to install the operating sys-
tem in a virtual machine. It is more practical and there
is there is no need for a dedicated computer just for
this purpose. We will call this machine ”HackOS”.
5.4 Install and Configure a Wireless
Network
Most smart home IoT devices require a wireless net-
work to communicate. By using a specific network
for the method we are reducing the number of com-
munications to analyse, and not taking the risk of ex-
posing other network devices to security risks. To
make intercepting communications easier we recom-
mend creating a WiFi Access Point in the ”HackOS”
machine.
5.5 Passive Information Gathering
This stage focuses on collecting information about the
smart home IoT device and its ecosystem. In this
stage no communication should be made with the IoT
device or its ecosystem. The point here is to deter-
mine what kind of information is publicly available.
This stage is divided into three procedures:
5.5.1 Proc. 1 – Identify the Device and its
Components
Before starting to collect more information about the
device it’s important to identify the brand, model and
manufacturer. If possible, the device should be dis-
mantled in order to identify any part numbers, logos
or other inscriptions.
5.5.2 Proc. 2 – Collect Documentation and
Information
The more information we collect on a device, the big-
ger the chances are of understanding the device and
how it interacts with its ecosystem. Look for user
manuals, API documentation, open source projects,
and firmware installationfiles;
5.5.3 Proc. 3 – Collect Information about the
Mobile Application
Most IoT device have a mobile application used to
control and collect data from them. On the Android
operating system it is possible to obtain an installation
file directly from an online repository. The following




5.6 Active Information Gathering
Active information gathering means collecting in-
formation about the smart home IoT device and its
ecosystem by communicating and intercepting their
network traffic. This stage is divided into three proce-
dures presented in the next subsections.
5.6.1 Proc. 1 – Device Identification
This procedure is about identifying the devices’ IP
and MAC addresses in the network. If the device has a
WiFi network for configuration we should try to con-
nect to it before making any configurations. Some
devices expose different ports or services or have a
different behaviour before they are configured.
To identify the IP and MAC address of the device
we recommend using the tool Netdiscover (https://
github.com/alexxy/netdiscover).
5.6.2 Proc. 2 – Network Traffic Capture
By capturing the communications sent and received
by the device and its ecosystem we can extract valu-
able information later on. Since some IoT devices
communicate in a different way based on their state,
it is important to capture the devices network traffic
in different states (Pesce, 2017):
• Booting up, without configuration and in stand-
by;
• Communicating with the mobile and web applica-
tions;
• During a firmware update;
• Without internet connection.
To capture the network traffic we recommend us-
ing the tool Wireshark (https://www.wireshark.org/).
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5.6.3 Proc. 3 – Port and Service Identification
The final procedure of this stage allows us to enumer-
ate the network ports that are open on the device and
what services they expose. Some devices have dozens
of open ports (Loi et al., 2017) that expose services
like SSH or Telnet.
The recommended tools for this procedure are
Nmap (https://nmap.org/) and Zenmap (https://
nmap.org/zenmap/).
5.7 Traffic Analysis
This section is about analysing the network captures
made in the previous section. The goal of this analy-
sis is to determine how the different ecosystem com-
ponents interact with each other, and what kind of in-
formation is sent and received. The following are the
key aspects to identify at this stage:
• Proc. 1 – Endpoint Identification: Identify IP ad-
dress, domain and location of all endpoints;
• Proc. 2 – Ports and Protocols: What network ports
and protocols were used;
• Proc. 3 – Data Sent Without Encryption;
• Proc. 4 – Files Intercepted;
• Proc. 5 – Information Sent to the Internet;
In order to analyse the network captures we rec-
ommend using the tool Wireshark.
5.8 Remote Access Vulnerabilities
Some IoT devices have a remote access protocol
available, like Telnet or SSH. In fact many devices
that formed the Mirai bootnet (Antonakakis et al.,
2017) were infected because they had their Telnet ser-
vice exposed to the internet with default credentials.
The most common attacks to these kind of services
are Brute-Force or Dictionary-Attacks.
To test if the remote access service is vul-
nerable to any of the attacks mentioned or oth-
ers, we recommend using the tools Medusa (https:
//github.com/jmk-foofus/medusa), Ncrack (https://
github.com/nmap/ncrack) or Hydra (https://github.
com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra).
5.9 Firmware Vulnerabilities
Exploring an IoT device firmware is one the most
common ways to identify its vulnerabilities. Since
some of these devices feature a striped down version
of a Linux OS, their file structure and services are
very similar to the desktop version. One of the most
common vulnerabilities found is the exposure of sen-
sitive information (OWASP, b) like login credentials.
We propose a two step approach in order to identify
sensitive information in the firmware.
5.9.1 Step 1 – Firmware Image Analysis and File
Extraction
The objective of this procedure is to extract the
firmware file system from the firmware image, typi-
cally a BIN file. Some vendors have these files avail-
able for download from their websites, or we can
try to get it by capturing the network traffic during
a firmware update (some devices use plain HTTP on
update). There are other methods that involve extract-
ing the firmware directly from the device storage, but
they require physical access to the device.
To extract the firmware files from the image
we recommend using binwalk (https://github.com/
ReFirmLabs/binwalk).
5.9.2 Step 2 – Firmware Analysis
After getting access to the files in the firmware we
can start to look for information that can help us iden-
tify some vulnerabilities and understand the device
behaviour. The information to look for is the follow-
ing (Gupta, 2017)(OWASP, a):
• Login Credentials - Usernames and passwords
left on the code;
• Backdoors - Most commonly Telnet or SSH ser-
vices;
• URL’s - Firmware or source code repositories,
unauthenticated cloud or API connectios, and
other;
• Criptographic Keys - Symmetric keys in the
source code or in a file;
• Cypher Algorithms - Information about encryp-
tion algorithms can help to decrypt communica-
tions;
• Authentication Mechanisms - Details about the
API, web application, or other authentication pro-
cesses.
To ease the process of going through all
the firmware files we recommend using a tool
called Firmwalker (https://github.com/craigz28/
firmwalker). This tool searches for specific words in
files (like ”password” or ”admin”), extensions, file
types and others. After running the tools it produces
a report of all the files that matched the search
criteria and even other information like IP and email
addresses.
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5.10 Mobile Application Vulnerabilities
Some mobile applications also expose sensitive infor-
mation that may help explore other vulnerabilities on
the ecosystem. Besides this, they can also have vul-
nerabilities of their own. This stage will only focus
Android applications.
In order to perform a full vulnerability analysis in
mobile applications there is a large amount of spe-
cific knowledge about the operating system and mo-
bile application development that is needed. But even
without that knowledge we can use tools to identify
vulnerabilities. This stage is divided into two steps
and offers a simple way to identify vulnerabilities.
5.10.1 Step 1 – Source Code Extraction
Many times, Android applications source code can be
extracted from the APK installation file. This file can
be obtained from one of the repositories mentioned
in Proc. 3 of stage 5.5. The files are then reverse
engineered into Java classes that can be analysed.
In order to extract the source code we recom-
mend using Jadx (https://github.com/skylot/jadx) or
QARK (https://github.com/linkedin/qark). The for-
mer can only be used to extract the source code, but
the latter includes other features covered in the next
step.
5.10.2 Step 2 – Source Code Analysis
The process of analysing the source code of mobile
applications has two purposes: (1) to better under-
stand the interaction of the different ecosystems com-
ponents and (2) to find vulnerabilities within the mo-
bile application.
This process is very similar to the one used in step
2 of the previous stage. In fact we recommend run-
ning the tool Firmwalker in the source code of the
mobile application, since it may have the same kind
of information leakage vulnerability. Another tool we
recommend using is QARK since it runs a static code
analysis algorithms in order to find vulnerabilities in
the mobile application.
5.11 Web Application Vulnerabilities
Web applications are still present in some IoT devices.
Their vulnerabilities can be identified with the same
tools used for common websites or non IoT web ap-
plications. IoT devices web applications exposed to
the internet are a serious threat to IoT security if they
are not properly secured.
Since the biggest threat to smart home IoT secu-
rity are automated attacks (see section 4.2), we can
use one of these automated scanning tools to identify
some of the web application vulnerabilities like the




In order to test the method we applied it to two de-
vices, a smart light bulb, the Yeelight Led Color (De-
vice 1) and, the DVR Dahua DHI-XVR5108H-4KL-
8P (Device 2). To the first device we applied most
of the method stages excluding the ones related to
the device firmware analysis and web application (the
device does not have one). For the second one we
only applied the passive information gathering and
firmware vulnerability stages.
Device 1 has a bare-metal OS and the firmware
source files could not be extracted. Nevertheless we
were able to obtain the firmware image through the
active information gathering stage.
We also performed an attack to the device
using a python library (https://github.com/rytilahti/
python-miio identified in the passive information
gathering stage. This library allowed us to control the
device trough its WiFi configuration network, with-
out any authentication. This attack explores two of
the vulnerabilities identified. The first one is the lack
of authentication on the configuration process, since
no password is requested for the WiFi configuration
network. The second one is an unauthorised control
vulnerability, since the device exposed an authentica-
tion token that allows its control. The attack is limited
to a 30 minute time window, since after that period the
network is turned off.
We were also able to find credentials in the mobile
application source code, that appear to be for a mesh
network authentication as well as some potential vul-
nerabilities in the mobile application reported by the
QARK tool.
On Device 2, we only had access to its firmware
(downloaded from the manufacturer website). This
device was used to test if the method could be ap-
plied without having physical access to the device.
We found critical information leakage vulnerabilities
in the device firmware. The device had default admin-
istrator login credentials in plain text on a configura-
tion file, possibly for the device web application. We
ran a search in the Shodan database and found more
then 14000 IP addresses that expose this device web
application to the internet.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
We presented a practical method supported by open
source tools that can identify high risk vulnerabilities
present in smart home IoT devices. By following this
method manufacturers and advanced users can test if
their devices are vulnerable to the most common vul-
nerabilities that are being exploited in cyberattacks.
Applying this method we were able to identify vul-
nerabilities in two test devices. By exploring some
of those vulnerabilities, we were able to control one
of the devices without authentication. We were also
able to identify vulnerabilities without physical ac-
cess to a device. These vulnerabilities can potentially
be exploited through the internet since thousands of
devices were identified in the Shodan database.
For future work we would like to develop specific
tools that could help automate the traffic analysis sec-
tion of the method. It would also be interesting to ap-
ply the method to different IoT ecosystems to further
test its applicability or even to introduce new stages
or steps in the proposed method.
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